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Justifying Inequality as Equality: Germany and the Reform of
Voting Weights in the Council of the European Union
Dirk Peters
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Frankfurt am Main, Germany
ABSTRACT
Weighted voting institutionalises inequality in international
organisations. How is it possible that states accept rules that
formally privilege some over others even though this contradicts the
sovereign equality of states and norms of democratic decision-
making? This contribution to a special issue about global
stratification shows that arguments about equality can actually serve
to justify inequality in international institutions. This can be seen in
moves by the German government to justify its proposals for a
reform of voting in the Council of the European Union (1995–2008).
Successive German governments focused on arguments about
democracy based on the equality of states and of citizens to justify
their push for a more privileged position for Germany in the Council.






The voting rules of an international organisation are a public display of the formal equality
or inequality among its members. Most organisations employ the one-state one-vote rule,
signalling the formal equality of their members. Some organisations, however, assign
different numbers of votes to their members or give some of them special veto rights.
The EU, for instance, has practiced weighted voting since the early 1950s. Other
notable organisations that followed this path are the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank and the United Nations Security Council.
Weighted voting appears to contradict powerful normative standards of decision-
making both in international relations and in democracies. It is in tension with the sover-
eign equality of states, which still constitutes an “axiomatic premise of the international
legal order”1 and with basic democratic norms requiring that, in making a democratic
decision, every vote should count the same. Weighted voting is thus not easily reconciled
with basic norms of political and legal equality.2 It requires additional normative
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justification, not only in international legal and democratic theory but also in political
practice. Political actors who want to institutionalise weighted voting systems will have
to justify this departure from norms of egalitarian voting in order to create acceptance
and legitimacy for them and thus a basis for their long-term maintenance.
While the question of how inequality becomes widely accepted andmaintained within a
society has been intensely studied by sociology from a wide variety of angles3, IR research
has tended to constrain its analysis of international inequality to treating it as the outcome
of economic, military or symbolic power disparities. Much less attention has been paid to
the sociological insight that inequalities require justification and legitimation and can,
through these processes, become widely accepted and normatively engrained in a
society. Examining how states justify the institutionalisation of unequal voting weights
in international organisations promises insights into this special issue’s core question of
how international organisations contribute to and stabilise international inequality, a
research topic that is gaining increasing attention in the IR literature.4
In this article, I will examine the normative underpinning of weighted voting in one par-
ticular organisation by studying the justifications put forward to defend it. I will focus here
on the European Union (EU), an organisation in which notions of political equality are of
high significance and even enshrined in its core treaty (Art. 2 Treaty on European Union).
Nonetheless, inequality in decision-making among EU governments has significantly
increased in recent years through an overhaul of the voting rules, a reform process that
has been publicly debated among governments for more than a decade. How did govern-
ments justify a decision-making system as acceptable, in which one of them (Germany)
wields significantly more formal power than any other government and a reform of the
voting weights which increased inequality among member states regardless of whether it
is measured in relation to governments’ voting power or the indirect voting power of citi-
zens5? Due to space constraints, I will concentrate on justifications put forward by one gov-
ernment, namely the most consistent supporter of the increase in institutional inequality,
Germany. I will analyse its justifications in detail but also demonstrate that its basic norma-
tive arguments were eventually accepted even by those originally opposed to the German
proposals. Thus, the core arguments of the German government have become part of the
commonly accepted normative framework, in which the EU operates.
The study will show that equality remains a very powerful normative standard for
judging international decision-making systems and that equality can serve as a justifica-
tion for institutional arrangements that actually increase inequality. The EU Council’s
new “double majority” voting system was justified as reflecting equal treatment of both
states and citizens by requiring a decision to meet two thresholds: a qualified majority
of states, which would also need to represent a qualified majority of the EU’s population.
Essentially, this “double equality” did not have an equalising effect but significantly
enhanced the voting power of the governments of larger states and especially that of
Germany.
3For a summary, see Caroline Fehl and Katja Freistein, “Organising Global Stratification: How International Organisations
(Re)produce Inequalities in International Society”, Global Society, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2020).
4See Fehl and Freistein, op. cit.
5Leech, Dennis, and Aziz Haris, “The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an
Enlarging Union: An Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis”, in Marek A Cichocki and Karol Życzkowski (eds.), Institutional
Design and Voting Power in the European Union (London: Routledge 2010), pp. 59–74.
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In what follows, I will, first, briefly discuss the importance of the justification of insti-
tutional rules for stabilising and legitimating them. Based on this, I will develop a frame-
work for analysing the justification of institutional inequality and put this frame to work
by analysing how the German government justified its reform proposals.
Justifying inequality in international organisations
Justification and legitimation in international politics
This study proceeds from the assumption that rules which institutionalise inequality
need to be justified and that examining these justifications sheds light on the normative
basis on which inequality in international politics is created and maintained. Justification
(that is, giving reasons) as such is a ubiquitous phenomenon in politics. Policy
proposals and decisions, including those concerning institutional designs, are defended
or contested by providing reasons (and counter-reasons) as to their desirability. This is
so not only because human beings are “reason-giving animals”.6 Rather, politics is a
conflictive process, in which different interests and views of the common good collide.
“Controversy is at the heart of politics”7 and reason-giving is a constitutive element of
controversies.
In politics, a core function of justification is the legitimation of authority or power. For
political decisions to be accepted as authoritative by those subjected to them, these
decisions need to be conceived as legitimate. David Beetham has pointed out that justifi-
cation is at the heart of creating such legitimacy, i.e. of the acceptance of authority as right-
ful. When justification serves to legitimate political authority, it takes a specific form.
Beetham argues that a power relation is legitimate if it can be justified “by reference to
beliefs shared by both subordinate and dominant”, if “it conforms to established rules”
and if the subordinates consent to it.8 Therefore, political actors can be expected to
justify decisions and proposals by referring to established rules and to shared beliefs in
a community, seeking the consent of those subjected to a decision. Studying justifications
thus provides an entry point for examining the normative reference points that legitimate
and thus stabilise political order.
A growing number of studies under the label “empirical legitimation research” has
examined public justifications in this vein and investigated how policies or political pos-
itions are publicly justified against the background of shared beliefs within a community
and how these justifications are contested.9 This research has focused especially on how
democracy serves as a powerful reference point for justifying policies and rules.10
Justifications of inequality in international decision-making, however, have not yet
6Charles Tilly, Why? What Happens When People Give Reasons - and Why (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
7Christian Bueger, “The Clash of Practice: Political Controversy and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission”, Evidence
& Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2011), pp. 171–191.
8David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 16.
9Achim Hurrelmann, “Empirical Legitimation Analysis in International Relations: How to Learn from the Insights – and Avoid
the Mistakes – of Research in EU Studies”, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2017), pp. 63–80; Frank Nullmeier et al.,
Prekäre Legitimitäten: Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der postnationalen Konstellation (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2010);
Jens Steffek, “The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach”, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), pp. 249–75.
10E.g. Steffen Schneider et al., Democracy’s Deep Roots: Why the Nation State Remains Legitimate (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2010).
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received much attention. Studying them, however, promises particularly interesting
insights about the significance of core norms in international politics. How can insti-
tutional inequality can be normatively maintained even though international decision-
making is located at the intersection of two normative frameworks that prescribe equality
among actors, sovereign equality of states and democratic decision-making?
The justification of unequal voting weights
Past research has only attempted to explain the existence of weighted voting in inter-
national organisations but not to reconstruct the normative grounds on which political
actors justify and maintain its existence. When looking for potential justifications of
weighted voting, causal explanations, nonetheless, can serve as a first guide. Such expla-
nations can be translated into justifications. If the existence of an organisation is conceived
as a common good and weighted voting is a necessary condition for the existence of that
organisation, weighted voting can be argued to be normatively desirable. Therefore, I will
briefly review the literature on weighted voting with a view to how its explanations could
feature as arguments in justifications of weighted voting.
Research on weighted voting offers two main explanations for the existence of unequal
voting weights: power and efficiency. Taking its cues from the broader public choice lit-
erature on voting systems11, this literature proceeds from the assumption that states
design voting rules with a simple goal: securing as much influence on the organisation’s
decision as possible without impairing the ability of the organisation to actually make
and implement decisions.12 Especially in large organisations and in organisations with a
long shadow of the future, states will be willing to accept non-unanimous voting to
escape the risk of paralysis.13 The weighting of votes becomes especially likely when
some states are needed more than others to achieve organisational goals. This holds
especially for two types of IOs: organisations, in which there is an easily identifiable
group of core actors necessary for their functioning, i.e. commodity-based organisations
as well as banks; and organisations, which have been founded with great power
participation.14
Therefore, weighted voting could be justified as functional necessity. Weighted voting
makes it possible to attract powerful actors to an organisation, which will then be able to
provide common goods for all members. Moreover, it may help to avoid paralysis in an
organisation and thus enable it to fulfil its purpose. The former argument, in particular,
concurs with the structural-functional theory of stratification in societies in its classic for-
mulation by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, which posits that positions which are of
central importance for a society are linked to special rewards.15
11See, for example, the contributions in Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1997), esp. pp. 149–244.
12Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger, “The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.
10, No. 1 (1998), pp. 125–142.
13Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions”, International
Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4 (2001), pp. 761–799 (pp. 791–792); Giovanni Maggi and Massimo Morelli, “Self-Enforcing
Voting in International Organizations”, American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 4 (2006), pp. 1137–1158.
14Daniel J. Blake and Autumn Lockwood Payton, “Balancing Design Objectives: Analyzing New Data on Voting Rules in
Intergovernmental Organizations”, Review of International Organizations, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2015), pp. 377–402.
15Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, “Some Principles of Stratification”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 10, No. 2
(1945), pp. 242–249. See also Fehl and Freistein, op. cit.
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Do actors actually employ such justifications? Can functional justifications override
norms of equality or do actors find other ways of justifying decision-making procedures
in which some enjoy a formally stronger position than others?
I will explore this question examining the introduction of double majority voting in the
Council of the EU. This reform considerably increased the voting power of Germany vis-à-
vis other member states and overall increased inequality in the Council, as will become
clear below. The EU lends itself to such an investigation for several reasons. To begin
with, this is a case in which governments’ justifications for institutionalising inequality
can be observed first-hand. In the reform process that took place since the mid-1990s,
different principles for designing decision-making rules were debated and governments
spelled out and justified their positions publicly over a period of more than ten years.
Moreover, it is widely accepted today that analysing the EU can provide important insights
into broader questions of international cooperation and organisation, especially when
major institutional questions are concerned. This is so at least since Andrew Moravcsik,
in his landmark study on European integration, argued that major integration decisions
should be studied as problems of international cooperation rather than as issues of Euro-
pean integration in need of sui generis theories.16 Today, a significant strand of studies on
major issues of European integration employs and informs general IR theorising.17 The
issue at stake in the present study, the legitimation of rules for supranational decision-
making, is one that applies not only to the EU but to all international organisations
whose decisions are binding for their member states.
I will not be able to analyse the complete reform discourse and all justifications put
forward in it in this article. Rather, I will focus on the actor that stood to benefit most
from the reform, the German government. It will be the actor pressed hardest to bring
forward justifications for the non-egalitarian character of the new voting system. In the
conclusion, I will also briefly illustrate that Germany’s justifications eventually became
the generally accepted standard in the reform debate even for those who did not share Ger-
many’s proposal for reforming the system of voting weights.
Before I turn to this investigation, I will briefly recount the debate about the reform of
weighted voting in the Council of the EU as a background for the German arguments.
Reforming voting rules in the Council of the EU
The system of group-based voting weights
The EU has a highly complex decision-making process that involves the European Com-
mission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The Council
is the body in which EU member states are represented at the ministerial level. There is
a tacit rule that decisions in the Council are to be taken by consensus and most decisions
are made this way.18 If no consensus can be achieved, however, formal votes can be taken
and there is a growing tendency to actually do so. Depending on the issue to be decided,
16Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 19.
17See also Mark A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies,
Vol. 39, No. 2 (2001), pp. 221–244; Mark A. Pollack, “Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic
Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8 (2005), pp. 357–398.
18Fiona Hayes-Renshaw, Wim Van Aken and Helen Wallace, “When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly”,
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2006), pp. 161–194.
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voting rules differ and since the Maastricht Treaty went into force in 1993, the rule for the
bulk of policy decisions was qualified majority voting (QMV). In a QMV decision, member
state votes are weighted according to voting weights defined in the founding treaties of the
Union and a certain quorum of votes needs to be achieved for a positive vote (around 70%
of weighted votes). Voting weights reflect roughly the size ofmember states, yet on the basis
of degressive proportionality, which is to say that smaller member states receive a larger
share of votes than their size in terms of population or GDP would suggest.
The exact number of votes that every state receives changed over time. Reforms of the
voting system were mainly due to the successive enlargements of the EC/EU. Originally
there were three groups of states, big states which received four votes (France, West
Germany and Italy), medium-sized states with two votes (Belgium and the Netherlands),
and Luxembourg which received one vote. The number of state groups, their voting
weights and the threshold necessary for winning a vote were adjusted after the enlarge-
ment of 1973 (UK, Denmark and Ireland). Afterwards, Greece (1981) as well as Spain
and Portugal (1986) were integrated into the system, which, once again, necessitated
adjustments in the threshold of votes for making a decision. This, however, lead to an
aggravating disproportionality where voting weights on the one hand and overall
weight in terms of population size increasingly grew out of proportion. Over the years
this put large member states more and more at a disadvantage.19
The reform process
The prospect of further enlargement after the end of the Cold War to include not only
Finland, Austria and Sweden but, at a later point in time, also the newly democratising
states of Central and Eastern Europe necessitated yet another adjustment of the system
and the big states obviously had an interest in not letting disproportionality get out of
hand. The problem was addressed as part of a larger process of institutional reforms in
the Union. These reforms were negotiated at a series of so-called Intergovernmental Con-
ferences (IGC), a process that can go on for years and usually ends with a summit of EU
members’ heads of states and governments. The reform of voting rules in the Council was
tackled first at the Amsterdam IGC (1995–1997) but a final compromise was only reached
at the conclusion of the Lisbon IGC (2007). The debate was started by the big states which
voiced their concerns about the increasing disproportionality. This problem was especially
pressing for Germany, which had added another 16 million people to its population
(almost the size of the Netherlands) through unification without adjustments in its
voting weight. From the beginning, two basic options for a reform of voting rules were
put on the table: sticking to the old system of group-based inequality and simply re-
weighting the votes to make sure that big states regained a larger share of the total vote;
or drawing up a completely new system. The latter would be a “double majority”
system which would combine some traditional majority requirement for the vote
among state representatives with some requirement for the number of citizens represented
by this majority.
19For a detailed analysis of the implications see, for example, Michel Le Breton, Maria Montero and Vera Zaporozhets,
“Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics”, Mathematical Social
Sciences, Vol. 63, No. 2 (2012), pp. 159–73; Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover, The Measurement of Voting Power:
Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes (Cheltenham: Elgar 1998).
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I will not go into the technical intricacies of the debates around these issues but just
outline the basic chronology of negotiations to clarify the setting for the analysis that
follows. At the Amsterdam IGC, negotiations proved so difficult and enlargement still
so distant that members agreed to deal with the voting issue at another IGC preceding
the Eastern enlargement. The subsequent Nice IGC (2000–2001), however, did not
bring much progress either. Eventually supporters of the double-majority idea and of a
re-weighting of votes reached a compromise that left everyone unhappy.20 Voting
weights were adjusted somewhat without really alleviating the disproportionality
problem and a triple majority system was created. The winning side of a vote now
needed (1) a qualified majority of weighted votes (somewhat above 72%); and (2) a
majority of member states which (3) represented at least 62% of the Union’s population.
This new system received much criticism. The next round of reforms was negotiated at
the European Convention which included not only government representatives but also
parliamentarians and in whose deliberations members of civil society were also included.
The Convention came up with a bold proposal: a simple double majority system in which a
(unweighted) majority of member states representing a majority of the EU population was
required for a positive vote. However, member state representatives, discussing the Con-
vention proposal at a subsequent IGC (2003/2004) could not agree on it and instead came
up with a somewhat watered-down version that was at the same time intended to make
transition to a double majority system easier. According to the resulting Constitutional
Treaty a majority to win a vote had to consist of 55% of member states, but at least 15
of them, which represented at least 65% of the Union’s population.
This double majority compromise was threatened after the Constitutional Treaty had
been rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands. At the Lisbon IGC (2007),
which was called to modify the rejected Treaty, Poland fought hard to return to the
triple-majority system of Nice. In response to these concerns, the Lisbon Treaty postponed
the introduction of the new double majority system. It eventually went fully into force in
April 2017.
Examining Germany’s justifications
The German government strongly supported the double-majority system in this debate.
The double majority promised a considerable gain in voting power for Germany. It is
easy to see, therefore, why the German government would take this position. Yet it is
less easy to see how such a shift could be justified. After all, it would keep inequality
firmly institutionalised in the Council. A simple double majority system would enhance
Germany’s voting power vis-à-vis all other EU members, significantly reduce that of the
states which formerly held equal voting power with Germany and abolish intra-group
equality of voting power across the board.21 How did Germany seek to create legitimacy
for the move, by pointing to functional necessities or by tapping alternative legitimacy
resources?
20Mark Gray and Alexander Stubb, “Keynote Article: The Treaty of Nice – Negotiating a Poisoned Chalice?”, Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, No. s1 (2001), pp. 5–23.
21For detailed calculations, see Madeleine O. Hosli, “The Balance between Small and Large: Effects of a Double-Majority
System on Voting Power in the European Union”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1995), pp. 351–370.
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To find out, I will explore the repertoire of justifications that the German government
employed and assess the significance of functional arguments vis-à-vis others to establish
which normative basis for institutional inequality the German government sought to
establish. In contrast to legitimation statements22, justifications do not simply state that
an institution is worthy of support. This is implied as the speaker puts forward a proposal
and, by implication, claims that it is worthy of support. Instead, they provide reasons for
why this is the case by arguing that a proposal concurs with something that the group in
question values.
To identify justifications, I examined a set of public statements, in which members of
the German government formulated a position for the reform of voting weights in the
Council of the EU during the reform process, i.e. between 1995 and 2008. This set of state-
ments comprehensively covers all parliamentary speeches by members of the governing
coalitions. It also includes all statements documented by the German federal government
in its official publication, the Bulletin der Bundesregierung. More specifically, I first ident-
ified all speeches in the lower chamber of the German parliament, the Bundestag, in which
a member of the Cabinet or a parliamentarian from the governing coalition addressed the
reform of EU Council voting rules. I dropped all speeches in which neither a policy pos-
ition was formulated (i.e. an answer to the question what Council voting rules should look
like) nor a justification was explicated (why should Council voting rules be changed or
maintained?). This left 43 parliamentary speeches in the collection, in which 68 justifica-
tions were made. Secondly, I included all official German government statements as docu-
mented in the federal government’s Bulletin which formulated a position and/or a
justification concerning the Council voting reform debate. This subset includes speeches
by government ministers and the Chancellor to domestic and international audiences
as well as formal position statements as, for example, German-French positions formu-
lated in the context of IGCs. Wherever possible this part of the set was complemented
by official positions as formulated in EU meetings. Minutes and summaries of such meet-
ings have been made publicly available until the year 2000.23 These sources resulted in
another 30 documents with 34 justifications.24 Overall, the collection consists of 73 docu-
ments with 102 justifications.25
I classified the justifications put forward by Germany in a recursive process. I started
with a list of potential justifications derived from the voting power literature. Accordingly,
the German government and its supporting coalition could justify their reform proposal
by reference to their power position, arguing that more powerful countries deserve more
weight in decision-making. I also included justifications that make reference to the
German “interest” in this category. Secondly, the efficiency of EU decision-making
could be referred to, arguing that a reform proposal would enable the EU to deliver
22Steffen Schneider, Frank Nullmeier and Achim Hurrelmann, “Exploring the Communicative Dimension of Legitimacy: Text
Analytical Approaches”, in Achim Hurrelmann, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek (eds.), Legitimacy in an Age of Global
Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 134–135.
23They are available via the European Commission’s DORIE website <https://ec.europa.eu/dorie> and the website of the
Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe <https://www.cvce.eu/en>.
24Parliamentary speeches are cited from the official record, Plenarprotokolle des Bundestags (PlPr) with column number and
date. The Bulletin der Bundesregierung is cited here as Bulletin with title and Bulletin number. All direct quotes from
German and French sources are translations by the author.
25A sentence that contains two justifications (“We favour the double majority because it both enhances democracy and
efficiency of EU decision-making”) is counted as two distinct statements. The full list of documents and the dataset
with the codings are available from the author.
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results, for example by preventing gridlock. I added equality as a third category because
equality concerns are the obvious “elephant in the room” when the weighting of votes
is being discussed. In a second round, I went through the remaining justifications and
classified them into abstract categories, which I will spell out below. For all categories I
also identified how, according to the speaker, the policy proposal would make the contri-
bution claimed in the statement; that is, how the double majority would make policy-
making more efficient etc. These subcategories enable me to give a more differentiated
account of how German policy-makers sought to legitimize the design choices they pro-
posed. The resulting categories and subcategories were documented in a concise codebook,
whose categories and subcategories are reproduced in the tables below. Codings of all
documents were double-checked against this codebook in a third and final round.
From this analysis, a clear common thread emerges. German governments used equal-
ity as their main normative reference point to justify decision-making rules that actually
would privilege Germany in the Council. Efficiency arguments were prominent as well and
fairness was added as a justification of minor importance.
Equal, efficient and fair: how Germany justified the double majority
There were three German governments in the period investigated here. The coalition of
Christian Democrats and Liberals under Chancellor Helmut Kohl (until 1998), the
coalition of Social Democrats and Greens under Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005) and
the “Grand Coalition” of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats under Angela
Merkel (2005–2009). Even though this is an ideologically diverse set of governments,
they took very similar positions in the debate about the reform of voting in the Council
of the EU. In principle, they all advocated a move towards a greater weight for
Germany in Council decisions. In the very early stages of the reform debate and during
the Nice endgame, when the double majority did not appear to be a realistic option, the
government was sometimes content with supporting a reweighting of votes. However,
the move towards a double majority was a clear preference already in the mid-1990s
and became the only option for Germany after Nice.
How did German governments seek to justify this position? It is important to
note, first, that the governments took care to present public justifications throughout.
Statements of policy position are rarely just bare statements of the position. In 89
percent of the statements, the policy position is followed by a principled justification.
There are just 12 statements in which a position is formulated without such justifi-
cation. Moreover, all three governments rely on a similar repertoire of justifications.
It consists of two major arguments about which principles German proposals seek to
advance: efficiency of EU decision-making, on the one hand, and equality and
democracy, on the other hand. As Figure 1 illustrates, the clear majority of
German justifications refers to these principles. Much less weight is given to argu-
ments about fairness between member states. German interests and power are
almost absent from German justifications. I will address these arguments, in turn,
describe and illustrate them in more detail and then discuss the overall pattern of
how the increase in inequality between governments in the Council is justified by
one of its most ardent supporters.
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Efficiency
Efficiency arguments figure prominently in functionalist explanations of inequality.26 Just
as in these explanations, German legitimation moves construe the effective functioning of
the EU as a common good that requires adequate institutional design. That the German
position will be strengthened as a result is treated as a side effect and barely mentioned. At
closer inspection, however, the arguments put forward by the members of Germany’s gov-
erning coalitions do not serve as justifications of inequality in the Council but rather justify
a different system for calculating majorities.
As Table 1 illustrates, German efficiency arguments focus on the ease with which
decisions can be made in the Council, especially after enlargement. German policy-
makers state time and again that they advocate a reform of voting rules in order to
ensure that the EU maintains its ability to act27, its functioning28 and effectiveness.29
Sometimes they just state that a reweighting of votes is a prerequisite of enlargement30
or an enlargement without reweighting could “create problems”.31
The link between enlargement and the threat of a paralysed EU, however, is never really
specified until December 2003, shortly before enlargement and in Germany’s final push
for the double majority. The double majority, it now was argued, would make it more
difficult to block decisions in the Council. In one of his most elaborate justifications of
the German position, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer argued in December 2003 that
the old system of weighting votes was built around the ability of minorities to block
decisions in the Council, whereas the double majority would make it easier to create
Figure 1. German justifications for Council voting reform, 1995–2008.
26For example, Davis and Moore, op. cit., Blake/Payton, op. cit.
27Klaus Kinkel, “Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen - Perspektiven der Zusammenarbeit. Beitrag für die Zeitschrift ‘La
Tribune Franco-Allemande’”, Bulletin, No. 07-98 (27 January 1998); Joschka Fischer, “Zukunftsfähigkeit und Legitimität der
Europäischen Union - Rede von Bundesaußenminister Fischer in Paris”, Bulletin, No. 04-99 (25 January 1999); Joschka
Fischer, “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, zum Ende der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft in
der Europäischen Union vor dem Europäischen Parlament am 21. Juli 1999 in Straßburg”, Bulletin, No. 45-99 (22 July
1999); Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Wechsel im Amt des Präsidenten des Bundesrates - Rede des Chefs des Bundeskanzler-
amtes, Staatssekretär Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, zum Antritt als Präsident des Bundesrates am 5. November 1999 in
Bonn”, Bulletin, No. 78-99 (9 November 1999).
28Anna Lührmann, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2013), 7143A.
29Steinmeier, op. cit.
30Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, “Gemeinsamer Brief des Bundeskanzlers der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Gerhard
Schröder, und des Präsidenten der Französischen Republik, Jacques Chirac, an den amtierenden Vorsitzenden des Euro-
päischen Rates und Bundeskanzler der Republik Österreich, Viktor Klima”, Bulletin, No. 79-98 (10 December 1998); Joschka
Fischer, “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Joschka Fischer am 12. Mai 2000 in der Humboldt-Universität in
Berlin”, Bulletin, No. 29-1 (24 May 2000); Gerhard Schröder, PlPr, 14/117 (13 September 2000), 11220A.
31Karl Lamers, PlPr, 13/185 (27 June 1997), 16745C.
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positive majorities and would thus ensure the Council’s ability to act.32 The contrast
between destructive “blocking minorities” (Blockademinderheiten) and “constructive
majorities” (Gestaltungsmehrheiten) became a staple of German speeches on the weighting
issue in the following months. It was a favourite trope of Foreign Minister Fischer33 in the
post-Convention debate but was taken up also by members of the Social Democrats.34
Two observations are particularly notable regarding the efficiency argument. First, it
was particularly prominent in one specific phase of the negotiation process, namely
after the Convention. It was used as an argument in favour of moving from the Nice
system to the double majority and it lost much of its significance once member states
agreed to abandon the Nice system.35
Second, and more importantly here, there is no obvious direct link between this type of
efficiency and a weighting of votes. The ease with which decisions can be blocked hinges
on the size of the majority needed, not on the weights themselves. In this sense a one-state
one-vote simple majority system would be the most efficient one. Efficiency thus under-
stood is not a justification of inequality per se. Rather it is a criterion that can be
applied to decision-making systems based on both equal and unequal treatment of their
participants. It is not surprising, then, that the efficiency argument usually is made in con-
junction with other arguments. In other words, justifications for the very fact of inequality
and for how unequal weights in decision-making should be assigned to EU members have
to be found elsewhere. And they can indeed be found in two other sets of justifications:
arguments about fairness and arguments about equality and democracy.
Fairness
Let us first turn to fairness arguments. They are less prominent and occur only 9 times (as
opposed to 30 references to efficiency and 58 to equality and democracy). But they present
a straightforward justification for inequality as they are based on the assumption that enti-
ties with different qualities should be treated differently to ensure fairness. They also
provide an instructive contrast to the much more prominent equality/democracy
justifications.
Table 1. Number of German justifications: Efficiency arguments, 1995–2008.
German proposals…
…make it more difficult to block Council decisions. 11
… ensure the functioning of the EU after enlargement. 9
…make it possible to expand majority decisions to additional policy areas, thus enhancing efficiency
of decision-making.
5
…make decision-making more efficient (no specification). 5
Efficiency overall 30
32Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7131D–7132B.
33Ibid.; Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/84 (19 December 2003), 7428D and PlPr, 15/92 (13 February 2004), 8204D–8205A; Joschka
Fischer, “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, zur Eröffnung des ‘Internationalen Bertelsmann
Forums’ am 9. Januar 2004 in Berlin”, Bulletin 03–1 (9 January 2004).
34Hans Martin Bury, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7157B and PlPr, 15/102 (1 April 2004), 9216B; Angelica Schwall-Düren
PlPr, 15/84 (19 December 2003), 7415A and PlPr, 15/92 (13 February 2004), 8195D–8196A; Michael Roth, PlPr, 15/112 (28
May 2004), 10223A-B.
35During the Lisbon ratification debate, it is mentioned only once and very briefly by CDU MP Andreas Schockenhoff, PlPr,
16/151 (13 March 2008), 15840A.
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As Table 2 shows, the key criterion which demands differential treatment is the size of
member states in German fairness arguments. They are based on the assumption that a
state’s size, in terms of its population, should somehow matter in the Council. This, of
course, is the long established practice in the Council. Based on this assumption, the
German government argued that German unification (without an increase in German
votes) and Eastern enlargement (with the inclusion of additional small states) significantly
shifted the balance between big and small states in the Council to a degree where the dis-
tribution of votes would become unfair. At a meeting during the Nice IGC the German
government presented the other states with a simple calculation to drive home this
point. Germany, at the time, held 10 votes (unchanged since 1973). Its population, the
argument went, was equal to that of ten smaller states which together held 34 votes.
After enlargement, its population size would equal that of 17 smaller states which together
would hold 57 votes if the system was not modified.36 Implicit in this calculation was the
argument that the disproportionality between population size and number of votes would
get out of hand through enlargement.
The argument became less indirect and more often used as a justification of the double
majority after the Convention. The Convention draft was praised as “fair and balanced”37
because it prevented the big states from being outvoted by the small states (due to the
population criterion) and the small states being outvoted by the big states (due to the
state majority criterion). This was argued to ensure “a fair balancing of interests”
“between the big and the small ones within the Union”.38 Regularly, these justifications
refer to the differentiation between “the small” and “the big” states in the Union, some-
times specified as 19 small and six big states.39 EU decision-making is depicted as charac-
terised by the search for compromise between these two groups and consequently the
double majority, which requires such compromise, is argued to be the best decision rule
available.40 The fairness justification thus is based on the idea that the distinction
between small and big members is salient and itself justified. Given this distinction, fair-
ness requires a decision rule that ensures that neither side is dominated by the other. The
same argument could be made for the balance between member states that are net contri-
butors to the EU budget and those that are net receivers but this argument is made explicit
only once and only in an internal EU meeting.41
Table 2. Number of German justifications: Fairness arguments, 1995–2008.
German proposals…
… ensure that both small and large countries need to strike compromises. 6
… ensure that net contributors and net receivers need to strike compromises. 1
… ensure fairness in Council decision-making (no specification). 2
Fairness overall 9
36See CIG Groupe des Représentants - 25 septembre 2000 - Déjeuner - Pondération des voix, D(2000)0167/PVN/amt (26 Sep-
tember 2000), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/dorie> (accessed: 17 September 2018).
37Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/72 (6 November 2003), 6166C.
38Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7131D
39Joschka Fischer PlPr, 15/72 (6 November 2003), 6166C, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7131D–7132A; Joschka Fischer,
“Rede zur Eröffnung des ‘Internationalen Bertelsmann Forums’”, op. cit.; Hans Martin Bury, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December
2003), 7157B; Marianne Tritz, PlPr, 15/160 (24 February 2005), 14919A.
40See especially Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7132A.




While the fairness argument proceeds from differences inherent in states as a justification
for inequality, the single most important justification put forward by successive German
governments instead proceeds from the equality of states and the equality of citizens in the
European Union and argues that decision rules need to express this double equality.
Analytically, the justifications collected under this category and summarised in Table 3
can be distinguished in two subcategories. On the one hand, they focus on the equality of
states and citizens; on the other hand, they centre on general characteristics of democra-
cies, especially the principle that decisions are made by majorities and that decision rules
should not be opaque. However, in practice, these two subcategories are closely inter-
twined in arguments put forward by German governments and their supporting
coalitions. All justifications listed in Table 3 centre on a general commitment to democ-
racy as the key standard for evaluating decision-making rules. The double majority, for
example, is justified as concurring with “democratic principles”.42 The Nice compromise
is defended as acceptable “in terms of […] the democratic principle”43 and as “strengthen-
ing the democratic legitimacy of Council decisions”44 during the ratification phase. It is
characterised as “hardly democratic”45 two years later when the same government seeks
to have it replaced by the double majority. Democracy thus serves as a legitimating prin-
ciple even though its application to concrete rules is flexible.
Democracy as construed in German justifications is a system of rule and decision-
making that is centred on citizens. It has three major elements: representation of citizens,
majority rule and transparency for citizens. Consequently, decisions in the Council should
be made not (just) by a majority of states but they should reflect a majority of citizens.
Decisions that are made against the majority of citizens are argued to be undemocratic.
Already in 1995, the German government argued in reply to a parliamentary question
that it was “necessary in the interest of strengthening democratic legitimacy to make
sure that in the future, in an enlarging Union, Council decisions are backed by a
sufficient majority of the population”.46 Successive German foreign ministers argued it
would “strengthen the democratic legitimation”47 and express “the democratic principle
Table 3. Number of German justifications: Equality/democracy arguments, 1995–2008.
German proposals…
… reflect the double equality of states and citizens. 15
… ensure representativeness of Council decisions. 14
… reflect the equality of citizens. 2
…make decision-making easily understandable as required in democracies. 12
… ensure that decisions are made by majorities as required in democracies. 8
… are democratic (no specification). 7
Equality and democracy overall 58
42Hans Martin Bury, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7157B.
43Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 14/144 (19 January 2001), 14124B.
44Günter Gloser, PlPr, 14/179 (28 June 2001), 17615C.
45Michael Roth, PlPr, 15/72 (6 November 2003), 6158B.
46Bundesregierung, “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage des Abgeordneten Christian Sterzing und der
Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN”, Bundestag Drucksache 13/3198 (5 December 1995), Question 3.4.
47Klaus Kinkel, PlPr, 13/44 (22 June 1995), 3545D.
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of the Europe of citizens”48 if a reform of Council decision-making ensured that decisions
were made by states representing the majority of the EU’s overall population.
Principally, this could be ensured by a simple re-weighting of votes. Before enlarge-
ment, the German government employed the argument in this sense: “The objective of
reforming the weighting of votes must therefore be to ensure a more representative
balance between Member States so that the minimum percentage of the population
required for a qualified majority continues to be about 60%”.49 This “representative
balance” argument was repeated as long as the German government was open to settle
for a simple reweighting of votes.50
When the Convention draft firmly put the double majority principle on the table,
German justifications subtly shifted. They no longer referred to representativeness.
Rather, the core argument now was that the European Union was a particular kind of
democratic community, one in which there existed two different types of political subjects:
states and citizens. As democracy was based on majority decisions among equals, Council
decisions had to reflect both the majority of states and of citizens, and the double majority
was the most straightforward way of ensuring this.
The argument became central to German justifications immediately after the Nice com-
promise. In seeking ratification for the agreement, Foreign Minister Fischer told parlia-
ment that “the federal government would have preferred the double majority
procedure. […] It was the position of the federal government to bring to the fore the
two basic principles—equality of states and equality of citizens”.51 Starting after the Con-
vention, the “double character” of the EU as a “union of states and a union of citizens”
became a regular reference point for German policy-makers in defending their preference
for the double majority. At times, they simply stated this double character and presented
the double majority as a reflection52 or a “logical consequence”53 of this character. When-
ever they explicated this link, they emphasised that the double majority best reflected the
equality of states and the equality of citizens. Statements refer to the double majority as
reflecting both the “‘one state, one vote’ principle” and the “principle that all citizens of
Europe count the same”54; the “equal rights of all members” and the principle “one
citizen—one vote”55; the fact that the EU is a Union of “equal states and citizens”56; or
48Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 14/144 (19 January 2001), 14124A.
49“Policy document of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Intergovernmental Conference on insti-
tutional reform”, CONFER 4733/00 (21 March 2000), available: <https://www.cvce.eu> (accessed: 24 September 2018).
50Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac, “Gemeinsame Botschaft von Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl und dem Präsidenten der
Französischen Republik, Jacques Chirac, an den amtierenden Vorsitzenden des Europäischen Rates und Ministerpräsiden-
ten von Irland, John Bruton”, Bulletin, No. 102–96 (11 December 1996); Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 14/126 (25 October 2000),
12108C and PlPr, 14/135 (28 November 2000), 13038B; Joschka Fischer, “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen,
Joschka Fischer, vor dem belgischen Parlament am 14. November 2000 in Brüssel”, Bulletin, No. 76-3 (14 November
2000); Werner Müller, “Rede des Bundesministers für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Dr. Werner Müller, auf der Jahres-Mit-
gliederversammlung des Ost- und Mitteleuropavereins e.V. am 4. Mai in Hamburg”, Bulletin, No. 25-3 (10 May 2000);
Gerhard Schröder, PlPr, 14/135 (28 November 2000), 13027D–13028A.
51Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 14/144 (19 January 2001), 14124A.
52Michael Roth, PlPr, 15/72 (6 November 2003), 6158C and PlPr, 16/103 (14 June 2007), 10583B; Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/72
(6 November 2003), 6166B; Marianne Tritz, op. cit.
53Hans Martin Bury, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7157B.
54Gerhard Schröder, PlPr, 15/78 (26 November 2003), 6709D.
55Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7131D–7132A; Joschka Fischer, “Rede zur Eröffnung des ‘Internationalen
Bertelsmann Forums’”, op. cit.; Gerhard Schröder, “Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder an der Erasmus-Universität
‘World Leader Cycle’ am 15. April 2004 in Rotterdam”, Bulletin, No. 34-1 (15 April 2004); Gerhard Schröder, PlPr, 15/119 (2
July 2004), 10870B-C and PlPr, 15/175 (12 May 2005), 16349B.
56Anna Lührmann, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2013), 7143A.
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the “old, good principle that every state, independent of its size, has one vote” and that “the
votes of citizens have equal weight”.57
The double-equality argument often was accompanied by praise for the transparency of
the double-majority system, “a very beautiful and very logical procedure”.58 It was justified
as easy to understand by citizens—in contrast to the Nice system. “Majority rules need to
be understood. This is a key point of democracy, this is the prerequisite for
transparency”.59
German power and interests
Finally, “power” is effectively absent from Germany’s justifications. There is a set of jus-
tifications that can be classified as “interest-based” arguments. However, these are extre-
mely rare and occur just in five statements overall. Given that most of the documents
analysed are domestic speeches, the conditions for making interest-based arguments are
certainly favourable. It would seem like an obvious selling point vis-à-vis a German audi-
ence that the double majority system strengthened Germany’s voting power in the
Council. However, such arguments are rare, they never serve as main justification and
they are formulated very cautiously. Chancellor Schröder, for instance, once states in par-
liament he did “not want to hide that Germany’s position within the Union is enhanced
through the double majority”60, Conservative MPMichael Stübgen says he is satisfied with
the fact that the double majority, “in which especially Germany has a particular interest”,
could be retained in the Lisbon Treaty61 and Chancellor Merkel argues that the inclusion
of a population criterion “of course is important for Germany”.62 But this is a far cry from
the weight that is put on general normative principles for legitimising Germany’s insis-
tence on a reweighting of votes or the double majority.
Justifying inequality through equality, fairness, efficiency: implications
and conclusions
The analysis shows how powerful equality is as a normative reference point for justifying
decision-making rules in the EU. Moreover, it demonstrates that equality can be employed
as a normative standard to justify inequality. Eventually, the reform of voting rules in the
name of equality enhances the power of the German government vis-à-vis the other gov-
ernments in the Council.
This effect can best be understood by looking at the reform debate as one about categ-
orisation and distribution, as suggested by Fehl and Freistein.63 The key move in justifying
the double majority as enhancing equality is introducing a new category of political sub-
jects in arguments about inter-state decision-making: citizens. This layering of different
57Gerhard Schröder, PlPr, 15/106 (30 April 2004), 9586C.
58Angela Merkel, “Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Journalisten-Symposium des ‘Konvents für Deutsch-
land’ am 5. Dezember 2007 in Berlin”, Bulletin, No. 139–3 (5 December 2007).
59Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/72 (6 November 2003), 6166C. See also Joschka Fischer, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7132A;
Hans Martin Bury, PlPr, 15/82 (11 December 2003), 7157B and PlPr, 15/102 (1 April 2004), 9216B.
60Gerhard Schröder, PlPr, 15/119 (2 July 2004), 10870C.
61Michael Stübgen, PlPr, 16/115 (20 September 2007), 11946B.
62Angela Merkel, PlPr, 16/157 (24 April 2008), 16452C.
63Fehl and Freistein, op. cit.
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categories of subjects makes it possible to maintain the argument that the distribution of
votes is egalitarian—when looking at each category of actors in turn: that is, states count
the same when looking at the state majority criterion, citizens count the same when
looking at the representative majority criterion. As both subjects (states and citizens)
are represented by the same entity (governments), the effect, however, is an increase in
the inequality among both categories. This is most obvious for states. Under the double
majority rule the German government will be part of more winning coalitions than,
say, the French government, whereas they had the same number of votes and thus the
same voting power in the preceding system.64 This may be considered fair (larger states
deserve more influence) but it does not create equality between the two states.
The fact that the system, nonetheless, is justified as expressing the equality of political
subjects (states and citizens) rather than establishing fairness among unequal (e.g. big and
small) states underlines how attractive the equality standard is in contrast to arguments
that are based on inherent power differentials between states. Such arguments are possible
and other contributions to this special issue demonstrate the ability of governments to
mobilise arguments about their position in a hierarchy to justify institutional privileges.
Great power status, for example, was not only used as a justification for privileges in
League of Nations decision-making in the 1920s.65 It is still employed today, alongside
arguments about financial and troop contributions to UN peace-keeping, for instance,
as justification for more influence over decisions on peace-keeping operations.66 While
institutional inequality thus can be justified as reflecting existing hierarchies, the equal-
ity-based justification in the EU case proves to be particularly forceful. It makes it extre-
mely difficult for others to dismiss the German positions as simple egoistic moves to
enhance Germany’s influence in the Council. Moreover, equality and democracy are prin-
ciples that cannot be easily contested nowadays.
Making the power of these arguments fully visible would require an analysis of the legit-
imation discourse as a whole, which obviously is beyond the scope of this article. None-
theless, a cursory look at other major players in the reweighting debate offers a glimpse
at the significance of the double-equality argument. Both the French and the Polish gov-
ernment opposed the move towards the double majority and sought to introduce an
alternative normative standard into the debate, namely historical justice. The French gov-
ernment referred to the “perpetual equality” between France and Germany that had been
agreed in the founding treaties as a contribution to post-WorldWar II reconciliation67, the
Polish government to the fact that Poland had suffered significant losses in population
through World War II.68 But neither could fully ignore the justification Germany had
put forward. The French government explicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the
64Necessarily, the argument is more complex for citizens. Voting power analysis applies the concept of the “median voter”
to assess how much influence a state’s citizens have indirectly over Council decisions. Analyses along these lines demon-
strate that the EU’s double majority system generates more inequality than the previous system of weighted voting. See
Leech and Haris, op. cit.
65Thomas Müller, “Institutional Reforms and the Politics of Inequality Reproduction: the Case of the League of Nations’
Council Crisis in 1926”, Global Society, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2020).
66Katharina Coleman, “United Nations Peacekeeping Decisions: Three Hierarchies, Upward Mobility and Institutionalized
Inequality among Member States”, Global Society, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2020).
67Pierre Moscovici, Assemblée Nationale, Compte Rendu Intégrale, 2ème séance du mercredi 29 novembre 2000, p. 9522.
68George Jones, “Polish PM Adopts WW2 Rhetoric at EU Summit”, The Telegraph (21 Jun 2007), available: <http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1555189/Polish-PM-adopts-WW2-rhetoric-at-EU-summit.html> (accessed: 26 February
2019).
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German arguments.69 The Polish government implicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of
linking a government’s voting power more directly to population size—albeit in a quite
idiosycratic way—when it argued that Poland should be treated as if World War II had
not happened and it had 66 million citizens.70
The Polish government faced an enormous backlash for introducing claims to historical
justice into the debate and former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton summed up the result
of that debate: that legitimation based on democracy and the underlying norm of political
equality was easier to maintain than legitimation based on historical justice.
Over the years we have worked in the EU on the basis that as far as Europe was concerned,
there were no politics in Germany — that the Germans, because of war guilt, could be
expected to pay the bill. That era has passed. The war has been over for almost 60 years.
It is not reasonable to expect the Germans not to have the same demands for equality of treat-
ment as the Irish, the Poles or the Spaniards. The double majority gives them equal
treatment.71
I do not want to claim that German justifications serve as an explanation for the
eventual institutionalisation of the double majority in the EU. But paying attention
to this dimension of the political debate nonetheless tells us something of importance
for political analysis. Institutionalising inequality creates justice issues and political
actors need to engage with these issues in the political process. Analysing how one
of the key players in the EU, Germany, did this, not only highlights a case of creative
state craft, where arguments about equality were weaved into an argument in favour of
enhancing Germany’s voting power. It also makes visible crucial elements of the nor-
mative constitution of today’s European Union. It highlights normative standards of
which German policy-makers assume that they are valid in the EU and Germany’s
success in the debate contributes to their validation. Most importantly, citizens are
construed as political subjects in their own right within an international organisation,
alongside state governments. This turns out to be a highly consequential move as it
undermines two other normative reference points: the equality of states in inter-
national law and the need to restrict German power as a consequence of German
aggression in World War II. It thus serves to normalise the German position within
the EU and to justify inequality in the name of equality.
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